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There is a long history around children’s rights – arguments about whether children are 
capable of being rights-holders at all; debates around whether it is good for children that 
discussion focuses on their rights; queries about whether talking about rights has any 
practical benefit for children. In general, though with exceptions, those debates have moved 
in the direction of increasingly seeing children as rights-holders, and as this status being 
important for both rhetorical and practical purposes.  
 
One area where some progress has been seen is in court judgments. It is increasingly common 
in international and senior appellate courts, at least, to see reference to the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child 1989 and other sources of children’s rights (the African Charter, the 
European Convention, and so on). However, judges remain cautious. Too many cases, argued 
by and from the perspective of adults, end up being debated and decided on the basis of more 
conventional, adult-focused legal and moral grounds.  
 
For some schools of thought, this may appear unproblematic – it might be argued that ‘the 
law is the law’, and that judges apply a value-neutral approach to determining the dispute 
before them. However, that view has long been challenged by more critical scholars, 
approaching the issue from, for example, a CLS or feminist perspective. The children’s rights 
perspective has increasingly been making a claim to similar status as a challenger of liberal 
legal theory, and the practical utility of children’s rights when challenging judgments, 
legislation, policy decisions, and other state actions has been established by numerous 
scholars over recent years.  
 
Now, in a major new collection, editors Helen Stalford, Kathryn Hollingsworth and Stephen 
Gilmore show how a children’s rights perspective can be used by judges to think through 
cases involving children in different ways. Drawing on the earlier Feminist Judgments 
Project as inspiration, Rewriting Children’s Rights Judgments: From Academic Vision to new 
Practice demonstrates, on judges’ own terms, how 28 cases involving children could have 
been reasoned differently if they had drawn on a children’s rights perspective. As with its 
forerunner, the ‘rules’ for rewriting judgments are, basically, that the ‘new’ judgment can 
either be a fictional appeal or a concurring or dissenting judgment in relation to the existing 
decision; the broad conventions of judgment-writing have to be complied with (as to style, 
but also in terms of appropriate sources for a legal decision); and the authors must draw only 
on materials which were available to the court at the time of the original decision – the point 
is to show how the actual cases under discussion could, realistically, have been argued 
differently at the time.  
 Rewriting Children’s Rights Judgments opens with three chapters from the editors, all 
foremost experts in the field of children’s rights and child law. These chapters form a 
valuable opening, and would constitute an important contribution to the literature in this field 
in their own right even without the rest of the book.  
 
The first chapter talks about the methodology of judgment rewriting and its value from an 
academic and practitioner (judge) perspective. The editors also provide a thematic overview 
of the collection. These themes include concerns over the interests of children being 
subsumed by or lost entirely within discussion of adults’ interests; questions about how 
children are to be heard (adequately) within court proceedings; and issues around procedural 
fairness in cases concerning children.  
 
Chapter 2 offers an important discussion of children’s rights within the judicial framework in 
general from Stalford and Hollingsworth. As well as justifying the project’s focus on 
‘children’s rights’ per se, this chapter makes a powerful argument in favour of judges 
becoming children’s rights advocates. The authors also point out a number of trends where 
the courts have tended to perform less well in this respect – reinforcing fixed conceptions of 
children and of childhood; refusing to see children as rights-holders at all, or assuming that 
rights are adequately protected by an assessment of a child’s welfare or best interests (which 
the editors think should not be seen as interchangeable terms in the way most jurisdictions 
treat them); or the sidelining of children within the legal process or as legal agents at all. 
Recognising that some of these difficulties stem from aspects over which individual judges 
may have little control, Stalford and Hollingsworth suggest that at least a large part of the 
problem comes from judges’ lack of exposure to examples of thinking from a children’s 
rights perspective – a deficit which this collection aims to start to make up.  
 
Chapter 3 expands that aim with a discussion of what Hollingsworth and Stalford see as ‘the 
primary characteristics of a children’s rights judgment’ (p 53). While there is no one way of 
writing such a judgment, the authors here identify the core: ‘the overarching aim of a 
children’s rights judgment is to increase the visibility of children within the law by ensuring 
that their status as rights-holders is recognised, that their voices are heard and that their 
interests are identified and factored into judicial decision-making’ (p 53).  
 
These chapters therefore set the stage for the 28 chapters that follow. In each, there is a 
(reasonably short) introduction to the original case, setting out the legal context and some of 
the major themes or controversies of the decision being critiqued. This is followed by the re-
written judgments, most of which speak directly to the originals in explaining – in restrained, 
judicially-appropriate terms – their shortcomings when viewed from a children’s rights 
perspective. While most of the rewritten judgments do differ from the originals in terms of 
the outcome to which they come, that is not a necessary component of this exercise – the 
reasoning process can be as important as the actual outcome, and will naturally affect that 
outcome in a great many cases.  
 
Various themes can be seen through this collection of rewritten judgments. One trend picks 
up on something seen in the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, but in few other courts, 
to give children fictitious names, rather than anonymising them with initials. This habit, as 
‘Lord Justice Gilmore’ says in his judgment on Re W (A Minor) (Consent to Medical 
Treatment), ‘should at least serve to remind the Court and those reading this judgment that 
we are dealing with the life of a young person whose personhood and full range of interests 
warrant our very careful attention and utmost respect’ (p 220).  
 
Other cases show the use that can be made of a wider range of materials than judges tend to 
reference. Cases are typically argued based on legislation, case law and evidence prepared for 
the case itself; courts of final appeal are often the only places where broader arguments are 
aired, drawing on policy documents, advisory reports or academic writing. However, the 
rewritten judgments demonstrate the shortcomings of this approach in relation to the lower 
courts – the new judgment of ‘Lady Justice Williams’ in Re P-S (Children) makes use of 
General Comment 12 of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (p 171), while ‘Lord 
Arthur’ in R v JTB looks at the Beijing Rules (the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice) (p 433), to take just a couple of example.  
 
Some cases in the collection do a particularly fine job of highlighting the importance of 
children’s rights for disambiguating the interests of adults from those of the children who are 
the subjects of the decisions. ‘Lady Justice Fenton-Glynn’, for example, in her dissenting 
judgment in Re C v XYZ County Council, argues that the local authority in care proceedings 
has a duty to seek to identify the father of a child and to assess him (if he can be found) as 
well as members of the child’s maternal (and possibly paternal) family as potential carers for 
a young child, despite opposition to this plan from the mother. Similarly, ‘Lord Gilmore’ and 
‘Lord Freeman’ write speeches allowing a hypothetical appeal in Re T (A Minor) (Wardship: 
Medical Treatment) where the Court of Appeal had previously made an order which refused a 
liver transplant to a young child on the basis that his parents opposed it, with the inevitable 
consequence that the child would die.  
 
This collection is an outstanding contribution to the field, and its practical value can already 
be seen. Lady Hale has written a foreword to the book, but can also be seen to have taken its 
message to heart: very shortly after the book’s publication, the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom gave judgment in R (on the application of HC) v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions [2017] UKSC 73. Lord Carnwath gave the leading – conventional – judgment on 
the issue of  what rights so-called ‘Zambrano carers’ and their children have to state financial 
support. The appeal was dismissed. However, while concurring in the result, Lady Hale gave 
a separate judgment which can be seen as a ‘real-world’ example of a children’s rights 
judgment. For example, her Ladyship opens her judgment by commenting: ‘It is not a case 
about adults’ rights. It is a case about children’s rights - specifically the right of these two 
very young British children to remain living in their own country and to have the support 
which they need in order to enable them to do so’ (para 39). Later, in commenting on 
evidence for the Secretary of State, Lady Hale comments that she was ‘not impressed’: the 
evidence was ‘addressed to the parents, viewed as third country nationals rather than 
Zambrano carers, and not to the children. A child-focused approach would have been quite 
different’ (para 51).  
 
The practical implication of Stalford, Hollingsworth and Gilmore’s collection is therefore 
clear, and this book has potential to lend serious weight to the drive towards giving children 
and their rights the prominence and respect which they deserve. Rewriting Children’s Rights 
Judgments is essential reading for anyone working in this field, whether as an academic, a 
legal practitioner, a policy-maker or in the third sector. It will also make a valuable teaching 
tool, and offers potentially interesting ideas for teaching and assessment of students as well. I 
congratulate the editors and authors involved with this impressive collection, and recommend 
it in the strongest terms.  
